Research

Publications

Shorrocks, Rosalind and Roosmarijn de Geus. “How Do Citizens Develop Confidence in the European Union? The Role of Socialization Experiences.” Accepted with West European Politics

Solaz, Hector, Catherine de Vries and Roosmarijn de Geus. “In-Group Loyalty and the Electoral Punishment of Corruption.” 2018.  Comparative Political Studies, available here

Allen Stevens, Benjamin, Md Mujahedul Islam, Roosmarijn de Geus, Jonah Goldberg, John McAndrews, Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki, Peter John Loewen and Daniel Rubenson. 2018. “Local Candidate Effects in Canadian Elections.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, available here 

Under Review

de Geus, Roosmarijn. “When partisan identification and economic evaluations conflict: partisan voters and democratic accountability” Under review (working paper here)

de Geus, Roosmarijn, Peter Loewen, Daniel Rubenson, Benjamin Allen-Stevens and Md. Mujahedul Islam. “Ideological heterogeneity and voter turnout in Canada” Under review

Working Papers

de Geus, Roosmarijn, John McAndrews and Peter Loewen. “Is retrospective voting gendered? Evidence from a conjoint experiment in the United States and Australia.”

McAndrews, John, Roosmarijn de Geus and Peter Loewen. “How do voters evaluate allegations of misconduct against politicians?”

de Geus, Roosmarijn and Rosalind Shorrocks. “Where do female conservative candidates stand? A cross-national comparison.”

Book Project

Leadership and Expectations: Understanding the 2015 Canadian Federal Election. With  Peter Loewen, Daniel Rubenson and Royce Koop. Under contract with Toronto University Press

PhD Dissertation – Summary

My PhD dissertation is titled: “When Partisan Loyalty and Performance Evaluations Conflict: a Study of Cross-Pressured Partisans in the US.” (dissertation available upon request)

I conducted my PhD at the University of Oxford under supervision of Prof. Catherine de Vries. I was awarded the degree in July 2017, my dissertation was approved with no revisions.

Summary: a key expectation of elections is that voters hold elected officials to account for their performance in office. Yet, recent studies show that this mechanism often fails. Voters, and in particular partisan voters, often make irrational or biased decisions. In the dissertation I seek to move beyond the finding that partisan voters are biased and instead explore under which conditions (if any) partisan voters do punish their preferred party. I use four empirical case studies to explore this question. I focus on situations in which partisan voters receive an explicitly negative signal about their preferred party, my case studies thus cover: economic recessions, political scandals and allegations of political corruption. Using a combination of observational survey data, electoral outcomes and a purposefully designed lab-experiment, I find that partisan voters are responsive to signals about the quality of economic management of the incumbent government and that candidate competence matters at the local level. Yet, the electoral response to corruption and scandal are small or non-existent. In conclusion I argue that three factors moderate the extent to which partisan voters exercise accountability:  (1) individual voter characteristics; (2) the electoral context and; (3) the type of government performance. Partisans are not incapable of holding their preferred candidate or party to account for their performance in office, but neither should they always be expected to do so.