de Geus, Roosmarijn. 2019. “When partisan identification and economic evaluations conflict: a closer look at conflicted partisans in the United States.” Social Science Quarterly available here
Shorrocks, Rosalind and Roosmarijn de Geus. 2019. “How Do Citizens Develop Confidence in the European Union? The Role of Socialization Experiences.” West European Politics 42 (4) available here
Solaz, Hector, Catherine de Vries and Roosmarijn de Geus. 2019. “In-Group Loyalty and the Electoral Punishment of Corruption.” Comparative Political Studies 52(6), available here
Allen Stevens, Benjamin, Md Mujahedul Islam, Roosmarijn de Geus, Jonah Goldberg, John McAndrews, Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki, Peter John Loewen and Daniel Rubenson. 2018. “Local Candidate Effects in Canadian Elections.” Canadian Journal of Political Science available here
“Credit, blame and leadership stereotypes: are retrospective judgments affect by gender stereotypes? Experimental evidence from the United States and Australia.” (with John McAndrews, Peter Loewen and Aaron Martin) (under review – revise and resubmit)
“How do voters evaluate allegations of misconduct against politicians?” (with John McAndrews and Peter Loewen) (under review)
“Where do female conservative candidates stand? A cross-national comparison of the ideology of female conservatives.” (with Rosalind Shorrocks) (under review)
PhD Dissertation – Summary
My PhD dissertation is titled: “When Partisan Loyalty and Performance Evaluations Conflict: a Study of Cross-Pressured Partisans in the US.” (dissertation available upon request)
I conducted my PhD at the University of Oxford under supervision of Prof. Catherine de Vries. I was awarded the degree in July 2017, my dissertation was approved with no revisions.
Summary: a key expectation of elections is that voters hold elected officials to account for their performance in office. Yet, recent studies show that this mechanism often fails. Voters, and in particular partisan voters, often make irrational or biased decisions. In the dissertation I seek to move beyond the finding that partisan voters are biased and instead explore under which conditions (if any) partisan voters do punish their preferred party. I use four empirical case studies to explore this question. I focus on situations in which partisan voters receive an explicitly negative signal about their preferred party, my case studies thus cover: economic recessions, political scandals and allegations of political corruption. Using a combination of observational survey data, electoral outcomes and a purposefully designed lab-experiment, I find that partisan voters are responsive to signals about the quality of economic management of the incumbent government and that candidate competence matters at the local level. Yet, the electoral response to corruption and scandal are small or non-existent. In conclusion I argue that three factors moderate the extent to which partisan voters exercise accountability: (1) individual voter characteristics; (2) the electoral context and; (3) the type of government performance. Partisans are not incapable of holding their preferred candidate or party to account for their performance in office, but neither should they always be expected to do so.